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Abstract. The aim of this paper is to discuss the history of the Science Policy Research Unit and place it 
within the broader framework of the University of Sussex and the intellectual context of the period. This brief 
introduction helps to understand the origins of the Unit and the role played by such fi gures as Chris Freeman, 
Geoffrey Oldham, Jackie Fuller, and Roy MacLeod. The description of intellectual context includes the infl uence 
of sociological approaches to science which were strong in the second half of the 20th century.
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Naukoznawstwo na Uniwersytecie w Sussex
Abstrakt. Celem artykułu jest omówienie historii jednostki badawcze Science Policy Research Unit, wska-
zanie jej miejsca i sposobu funkcjonowania w ramach struktur Uniwersytetu w Sussex oraz przedstawienie 
kontekstu „intelektualnego” towarzyszącego jej powstaniu. To krótkie wprowadzenie pozwala zrozumieć genezę 
powstania jednostki oraz rolę jaką odgrywali w niej m.in. Chris Freeman, Geoffrey Oldham, Jackie Fuller, czy 
Roy MacLeod. Opis kontekstu „intelektualnego” dotyczy głównie wpływu podejść socjologicznych na naukę, 
które były szczególnie silne w drugiej połowie 20. wieku.
Słowa kluczowe: SPRU, naukoznawstwo, fi lozofi a nauki, socjologia nauki, polityka naukowa
When I received this very welcome invitation, I immediately wondered where 
I would have to look for material on the history of the Science Policy Research 
Unit. An hour or so later, I discovered that it had recently produced its own history, 
tracing its development and research output in considerable detail. Since this 
material, which includes audio fi les of interviews, is easily accessible on-line,1 
I shall concentrate here on putting the history of science studies at the University 
of Sussex into the broader framework of the University and the intellectual context 
of the period.
Sussex, which opened in 1961 with 52 students and soon moved to a rural 
campus on the edge of the south coast resort of Brighton, was the fi rst of the UK’s 
‘new’ or ‘plate-glass’ universities set up in the 1960s, with an autonomy in the 
construction of its curricula which it exploited from the beginning. The fi rst vice-
chancellor (rector), John Fulton, appointed the historian Asa Briggs (1921–2016) as 
pro-vice-chancellor and Dean of the School of Social Studies, one of several schools 
* For correspondence: School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, 5th Floor Claremont Tower, Newcastle 
University, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU, United Kingdom, e-mail: william.outhwaite@ncl.ac.uk
1 http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/about/history. The materials are available for consultation at the Univer-
sity’s archive: thekeep.info
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in which undergraduates studied their major subject along with interdisciplinary or 
‘contextual’ courses, throughout their programme and on a 50–50 basis. A student 
of sociology, for example, could be located in one of the two schools focussed 
on social science and cultural studies or in the three with a geographical focus: 
European Studies, African and Asian Studies and English and American Studies, 
which contained roughly equal numbers of staff from social science and humanities 
subjects. The binary division between the natural sciences and the rest was bridged 
by an ‘Arts/Science’ programme in which students in one took some courses from 
the other. The founder of the philosophy department established it on the zoological 
principle that it should represent as far as possible the diversity of species of 
philosophy, and it included colleagues working on, for example, Merleau-Ponty 
and Santayana. Jerzy Giedymin, who had been Professor of Logic and Philosophy 
of Science at Poznań, taught from 1971 in the School of Social Sciences and later 
in the School of Mathematical and Physical Sciences. Having published on Popper 
in Poland, in an article in 1959, ‘Inductivism and Anti-Inductivism’, he later brought 
the work of Ajdukiewicz to the English-speaking world in a book published in 1978, 
in which he stressed ‘how much of the so-called “new empiricism” of today was 
anticipated by Ajdukiewicz in the early thirties and the early fi fties.’ (Giedymin 
1978: xi; see also Giedymin 1975) He was also interested in the work of Roman 
Ingarden but did not, as far as I can see, write about it.
Professor Fred Gray, who edited the volume Making the Future, published in 
2011 to mark the University’s 50th anniversary, wrote: “Briggs, with wonderful 
imagination and intense determination, drove forward the making and development 
of Sussex.” In his essay in The Sussex Opportunity, an earlier book that celebrated 
the University’s fi rst 25 years, Briggs, who succeeded Fulton as Vice-Chancellor 
in 1967. himself wrote: “We felt a sense of privilege in being allowed to build 
a new university.” There is a lecture by Briggs in 2008 on http://www.sussex.
ac.uk/newsandevents/sussexlectures/2008?lecture=21&fmt=qt and another, on the 
sciences at Sussex, in 2012: http://www.sussex.ac.uk/newsandevents/sussexlectur
es/2012?lecture=96&fmt=qt
This institutional context at Sussex formed the background to the creation 
in 1966 of the Science Policy Research Unit; Chris Freeman (1921–2010), an 
economist who had worked in innovation studies using Kondratieff models, was 
invited by Briggs to direct it, which he did from 1966 to 1982. He also founded 
in 1971 the journal Research Policy, which is still edited from SPRU. The Unit 
began with Freeman, another economist, Geoffrey Oldham, and an administrator, 
Jackie Fuller, and quickly acquired the historian of science Roy MacLeod, now 
Emeritus Professor at the University of Sydney. MacLeod describes its beginnings:
I arrived at Sussex with the Michaelmas Term, 1965, in the School of Social Studies to work 
with Asa in fact, he wanted me to help him. He was working at the time on the history of the BBC 
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and I had worked a lot on science communication, partly in relation to the history of science but also 
partly in relation to contemporary science and its larger social dimensions and I was particularly keen 
to see what Asa had in mind to do in the arts/science issue at Sussex. This was the time of CP Snow 
and ‘The Two Cultures’ and I was very much taken up with that… And as you may know there was 
from the very beginning, plans, provision for an Arts/Science Scheme at the university and, although 
it wasn’t put to me in quite so many words, it seemed clear that Asa wanted me to contribute in some 
way to that. As it happened, fortuitously in my second or third month at Sussex – it must’ve been the 
autumn of ‘65 – Asa helped by Stephen Toulmin, his friend from Leeds, as before conceptualized 
the notion of a science policy unit, a unit for the study of science policy as it was then called, which 
took its start about the 1st January, as I recall, 1966. And Asa thought it would be sensible for me to 
join that group, a group of two at the time, and I did, and that was the beginning of SPRU.
At the SPRU Fiftieth Anniversary launch event Lord Briggs remarked to 
MacLeod that: “establishing SPRU, with others at the University Sussex, was 
one of the achievements he was proudest of in his whole academic and public-
service life”. Of the many other prominent scholars attached to the unit, perhaps 
the best known in this part of the world were the social psychologist Marie Jahoda 
(1907–2001), renowned for her earlier work in the early 1930s on the unemployed 
of Marienthal, and the political economist and peace theorist Mary Kaldor, now at 
the London School of Economics and working, inter alia, with a Polish colleague 
there on responses to Brexit on the mainland.
Another journal, Science Studies (now Social Studies of Science) was established 
by Roy MacLeod and David Edge, of the Science Studies Unit at Edinburgh, in 
1971.2 The fi rst editorial noted that
Over the past fi ve years, the study of ‘science policy’ has acquired international importance, and 
some academic currency… At the same time, the social framework in which the intricate concep-
tual structures of modern science have developed has begun to attract historians, sociologists and 
philosophers searching for analytical keys to the study of knowledge, the evolution of the scientifi c 
community, and the normative assumptions implicit in different scientifi c roles.
MacLeod restated this theme in 2011 in a statement when he was a guest at the 
Lichtenberg-Kolleg at Göttingen:
Recent scholarship has drawn attention to the shifting roles and responsibilities of scientifi c 
experts and technical expertise in modern Western society. In a tradition that extends from Max We-
ber and Karl Mannheim to Florian Znaniecki and Jürgen Habermas, historians and sociologists have 
discussed the origins and nature of the ‘social contract’ that has come to exist between producers of 
new knowledge, the institutions they have created, and the consequences for which they have been 
held accountable. For the last four decades, the emerging discipline of the ‘social studies of science’ 
has set itself the task of illuminating these contingencies and their role in shaping the relations of 
knowledge and power.
2 The journal included in 1975 a ‘Country Report’ on Polish ‘science of science’ by Bohdan Walentynowicz, 
editor of Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa.
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MacLeod set up in 1970 another academic unit at Sussex, History and Social 
Studies of Science, which was located in the School of Mathematical and Physical 
Sciences and offered both undergraduate courses and an MSc on which I taught 
from 1974 until some time in the late 1980s. HSSS and SPRU represented in a sense 
the two main poles of science studies at Sussex, with SPRU (into which HSSS was 
absorbed in 1983) focussing on externally funded research in the political economy 
of science, technology, innovation and warfare, and HSSS pursuing more historical 
and qualitative research and teaching (including provision for SPRU students).3 
As well as MacLeod, the core of HSSS included Brian Easlea, who transferred 
from physics after a life-transforming visit to Brazil and taught an extremely 
popular arts/science course. Unlike the much better supported Science Studies 
Unit at Edinburgh, with David Edge, David Bloor, Barry Barnes and for a time 
Steve Shapin, HSSS was starved of resources by the University and marginalised 
in the School. The Arts/Science programme, on which I also taught at least once 
and my Sociology colleague Kevin McCormick taught a course on The Engineer 
and Society, also withered, and after the withdrawal of the Arts Schools became 
little more than a way of enabling science students to develop skills of academic 
reading and essay-writing. (One group of students arrived expecting me to teach 
them about painting.)
I now turn to the broader intellectual context. At the beginning of the 1970s, the 
sociology of scientifi c knowledge was in its infancy (Shapin 1995), and Hermínio 
Martins (1973) pointed to the gap between the ‘sociology of knowledge’ – itself 
a rather marginal activity in sociology and the more institutional sociology of 
science, which was really a sociology of ‘scientifi c communities’ – though Robert 
Merton covered both, as in his 1945 ‘Paradigm’ essay (Merton 1945). Martins 
was concerned to head off a tendency in the social sciences to pursue notions 
of paradigm and epistemic consensus, shaped by positivism and the growth of 
technical methodology, arguing instead for the study of controversy, ‘cognitive 
agonistics’, in both natural and social science.4
The variations noted by Duhem (1906: 100) in what Ludwik Fleck (1936) was to 
call ‘thought styles’ are relevant both to the reception of physics5 and of the social 
sciences – the latter torn between the imitation of natural science and alternative 
antinaturalistic approaches.6 Kuhn’s intervention in 1962 was rightly perceived as 
a threat to what had come to be called the ‘standard view’ in the philosophy of 
science: a Vienna Circle empiricist model, more or less modifi ed with Popperian 
3 David Edge was a close friend of Keith Pavitt, another leading scholar at SPRU.
4 See Castro, Fowler and Gomes 2017.
5 Paul Forman (1970) suggested that quantum theory was welcomed in part in Weimar Germany because it 
counted against popular critiques of scientifi c determinism. In the German-language discussion, the key term was 
the perceptual accessibility (Anschaulichkeit) of physics – particularly that of quantum theory.
6 On the disjunction between philosophy of science and historical and sociological studies of scientifi c 
knowledge, see, for example, Golinsky 2011.
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epicycles. Although it was possible for Popper and his followers to claim that 
puzzle-solving normal science was simply not good science by the standards of 
critical rationalism,7 this conception of philosophy as a slightly weltfremd judge 
pronouncing on a massively expanding and stupendously successful social practice 
was not very convincing. A broadly Kuhnian or Lakatosian account of scientifi c 
practice therefore fi tted into the gradual process of modifi cation and unravelling 
of the positivist model which began as soon as it was articulated. Like Stalinist 
economic planning, or the latest innovation by Microsoft, it was no sooner in place 
than there were suggestions for what we would now call updates to make it more 
sophisticated and sensitive. As Peter Halfpenny (1982) brilliantly summarised the 
process, positivism tends to mutate into conventionalism or realism.
Nevetheless, as Steven Shapin (1995) pointed out, ‘scientistic North American 
sociological traditions and, to a lesser extent, traditions in Britain and Europe 
continue actively to disseminate a picture of scientifi c “method” and scientifi c 
knowledge radically at variance with those offered by SSK [sociology of scientifi c 
knowledge].’ This latter fi eld seems in retrospect one of the most innovative and 
impressive features of English-language, and particularly British sociology, yet one 
which remains marginal in the profession, and even within the interdisciplinary 
area of science and technology studies. Like Hermínio Martins, in the passage 
quoted earlier, Shapin (1995: 301–2) points to a paradox:
From a sociological point of view, Kuhnian SSK is at once conservative and radical. On the one 
hand, it seeks inter alia to answer traditional questions about the grounds of a communal order, and it 
does so by pointing to the regulative role of norms. While the regulatory relevance of social maxims 
(“Be sceptical”, “Be disinterested”) is doubted, the signifi cance of norms for ensuring order and for 
marking the boundaries of communities is vigorously respecifi ed and reaffi rmed in a new idiom. The 
solidarity of specialist communities – or such solidarity as is found to exist – is coordinated thro-
ugh their specialist knowledge. Good and bad, proper and improper, interesting and banal scientifi c 
behaviour is recognized and sanctioned by members’ knowledge of the natural world. On the other 
hand, by arguing that the relevant norms are made of the same stuff as the community’s technical 
knowledge, the Kuhnian move overturns the existing sociology-of-knowledge scheme that asks how 
“society might infl uence knowledge”…[Thus] SSK’s insistence upon a quite elementary feature of 
the sociological sensibility has seemed to acquire a shockingly radical, even subversive, character.’
This may partly explain why mainstream sociology in the UK and US was 
unwelcoming to the sociology of scientifi c knowledge, though other factors, such 
as the marginality of the sociology of knowledge as a whole and the entry costs 
of acquiring even a minimal reading knowledge of the relevant areas of natural 
science provide a more obvious explanation. More signifi cant is the wider social 
hostility to any social insight into or oversight of scientifi c progress. Whereas 
7 As Popper (1970: 57) put it, ‘to me the idea of turning for enlightenment concerning the aims of science, 
and its possible progress, to sociology or to psychology (or… to the history of science), is surprising and disap-
pointing.’
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a historian or sociologist of religion would be laughed at for suggesting that Judaism 
was succeeded by Christianity and in turn by Islam because that was what God 
wanted, any social explanation of scientifi c advance was suspected of ‘explaining it 
away’, as if the social explanation somehow undermined an alternative and perhaps 
complementary explanation in terms of ‘internal’ criteria of success.8
A particularly striking example of hostility to social approaches to science was 
a controversy in West Germany in the late 1970s around the ‘fi nalisation thesis’. 
This concerned the practical applications of mature science and was developed 
by a team of young researchers at the Max-Planck Institute for the Study of Life 
in Social-Technical World at Starnberg, just south of Munich. working with the 
physicist Friedrich von Weizsäcker. The thesis was presented in two articles in 
the Zeitschrift für Soziologie (Böhme, van den Daele and Krohn 1972, 1973), at 
a conference I attended in 1974, at Roy Macleod’s invitation, which brought together 
researchers from Paris and Sussex as well as elsewhere in Germany.9 Another 
article a little later (van den Daele and Weingart 1975) and a subsequent book 
publication in German (van den Daele et al 1978) and English (Schäfer 1983) drew 
on the history of science to suggest a three-stage model of scientifi c development. 
The fi rst two stages are familiar from Kuhn: a pre-paradigmatic phase and a phase 
of ‘normal science’ after consolidation around a paradigm or ‘disciplinary matrix’. 
The third phase, the authors suggested, is a phase of application or ‘fi nalisation’ 
in, for example, environmental science or process engineering.
This apparently innocent thesis in the history of science ran into a blizzard of 
criticism from the right-wing academics in the Bund Freiheit der Wissenschaft, 
which had been founded in 1970 in response to the excesses of the student movement 
of the late 1960s. A conference on ‘science in danger’ (Gefährdete Wissenschaft), to 
which the Starnberg group were not invited, was held in Munich in 1976, followed by 
a book, Die politische Herausforderung der Wissenschaft. Gegen eine ideologisch 
geplante Forschung, in the same year. (See also the book resulting from a more 
pluralistic counter-conference, bringing together both camps as well as a number 
of other contributors, Konsequenzen kritischer Wissenschaftstheorie, edited by 
Christoph Hubig, Wolfert von Rahden (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1977). Partly because 
of this controversy, the Institute was closed after von Weizsäcker’s retirement, and 
Habermas returned to Frankfurt in 1981 (see Leendertz 2010).
SPRU has so far not, I think, encountered such violent criticism, despite 
the extremely controversial areas in which it worked. The oral history which it 
conducted records a number of tributes by past and former associates to Freeman 
8 Kuhn addressed this issue in a number of places, for example in a contribution to symposium on Hempel 
in 1983 and published that year in The Journal of Philosophy (Kuhn 2000: 208–15).
9 Habermas was co-director of the Institute. Having been invited to comment on the fi nalisation thesis, we 
tried to earn our keep by making critical comments, to an extent which rather upset the researchers. Don’t worry, 
Habermas said to them, as I recall the discussion. Stick to your guns and say what you want; it doesn’t matter if it’s 
wrong – if it’s criticised, that’s how scholarly progress happens.
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and Jahoda. ‘They were described not only as impeccable, brilliant scholars but 
as generous human beings able to instil in SPRU a culture of openness, dialogue, 
supportive debate, and democratic practice.’ (Campos 2016: 9) SPRU survived the 
Thatcher years, when the UK’s Social Science Research Council was narrowly 
rescued from abolition at the price of changing its name to the Economic and 
Social Research Council, and thrived under the premiership of the economically 
literate Gordon Brown. It did however suffer from what seems like a typically crass 
managerial intervention in 2012 by the University to incorporate it into a newly 
concocted School of Business, Management and Economics, with the result that 
its very substantial library was dispersed. After some refl ection, SPRU decided not 
to leave Sussex, where it remains one of its star elements.
SPRU was of its time and place; it was set up at Sussex after the philosopher 
and historian of science Stephen Toulmin had looked for other universities which 
might host such an institute, and found a ready welcome from Asa Briggs. It 
undoubtedly benefi ted from the fl exible and innovative intellectual and institutional 
environment of the University’s early decades and has survived the retreat into 
a more managerial and discipline-oriented culture. There is perhaps a lesson for 
academic planners: the importance of institutions with a physical space in which 
to develop an esprit de corps, and also the fragility of small academic entities such 
as HSSS. Another research centre at Sussex, devoted to European Studies and 
directed by François Duchêne, was abolished in the early 1980s (and also absorbed 
into SPRU), only to be reincarnated in 1992 as the now thriving Sussex European 
Institute. Yet another, for urban studies, was also abolished, to the surprise of one 
of its associates returning from a period of leave abroad: ‘when I left, he said 
to me, ‘it was a world centre of excellence, and when I came back it had gone.’ 
A fi nal example from another university: Birmingham, which was perhaps best 
known to the outside world for its legendary Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies, set up in 1964 and headed by Stuart Hall, managed to close it down in 
2002. http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/schools/historycultures/departments/history/
research/projects/cccs/archive.aspx
As Sussex grew, there remained a hard core of faculty who had been there at the 
beginning and spoke nostalgically of the Gründerjahre. (Sociology, for example, 
began with a staff of two: the Romanian Zevedei Barbu, whose centenary was 
recently commemorated in Cluj, and an earlier exile, the German Helmut Pappe, 
who later transferred into Intellectual History.) Fifty years later, something of that 
early enthusiasm remains, and the very impressive SPRU History Project is one 
of the recent activities which document it.10
10 My thanks also to Roy MacLeod for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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